PART II. MH17 and Open Source Intelligence: The SBU and Its Volunteer Intelligence Unit
This document by Hector Reban, the second part on the Trial of the MH17 Suspects: The Case Against the Prosecution, contains essential material for our readers.
In this part we address the validity of the main source for the evidence so far presented by the Joint Investigation Team, ‘Open Source Intelligence’ (OSINT), originally on the MH17 website of Hector Reban. The story about the way in which evidence concerning the downing of flight MH17 has been gathered and disseminated to the public sphere seems to be part of a new phenomenon. Perception management to gain popular consent for political decision-making in cases of international importance is based more and more on OSINT, collected and explained by non-state actors (bloggers, NGOs).
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The Coming Trial of the MH17 Suspects: The Case Against the Prosecution – PART I
By Hector Reban
Published on the author’s own website, Mar 19, 2020
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CONTENTS
2.1. MH17 and Open Source Intelligence: A Suspicious Narrative 4
2.1.1. Methodological Limitations 5
2.1.2, Social media, OSINT and the JIT 6
2.1.3. The ‘Mounting Evidence’ Trap 10
2.2. The First Sightings of a Buk: Who Supplied The Images? 11
2.2.1. Dajey Petros, the SBU, and the Videos From Zuhres and Snizhne 11
2.2.2. The Strange Sourcing of the Paris Match and Makiivka Images 24
2.2.3. The Fear-of-Reprisal and the Need-for-Secrecy Theories 31
2.2.4. A Witness Account from an Associated Press Journalist 33
2.3. The Special Propaganda Unit of the Kiev Interior Ministry 39
2.3.1. Buk Witnesses 40
2.3.2. The Launch Plume Photo: Involvement of Anton Gerashchenko 44
2.3.3. A Triumvirate and Their Special Operations Militia 48
2.3.4. The SBU Surveillance Network in the Torez/Snizhne Area 57
2. 3.5. The Ukrainian Propaganda Machine: Manipulation Galore 60
2.4. The Donbass Buk—Phantom or Fact? 67
2.4.1. Some Observations about the Buk Trail Evidence 68
2.4.2. Evaluating the Buk Trail Sources 73
2.4.3. Established Media and Witness Accounts 88
2.4.4. JIT Fingerprinting and the Call for Convictions 96
2.5. The JIT, the SBU and the Intercepted Calls 102
2.5.1. JIT and SBU 104
2.5.2. Framing the ‘Main Scenario’ 109
2.5.3. Intercepted Calls: Markers and Edits 124
2.5.4. More Keywords and Triggers 131
2.5.5. Text Editing—Example: Khmuryi/Botsman (#12) 138
2.5.6. The “Buk” Tapes: DPR Disinformation? 144
2.5.7. The Disinformation Theory and its Implications 151
2.5.8. Indictments and the ICJ Case 155
2.5.9. A Political Game Surrounding the Intercepts 170
2.6. The Support from the Dutch Safety Board 174
2.6.1. Political Interference with the Investigations 175
2.6.2. The DSB Final Report 177
2.6.3. Criticism of the Findings 188
2.6.4. Other Parties Involved: US and Ukraine 193
2.6.5. Ukraine Off the Hook 206
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2.1. MH17 and Open Source Intelligence: A Suspicious Narrative
In this part we address the validity of the main source for the evidence so far presented by the Joint Investigation Team, ‘Open Source Intelligence’ (OSINT), originally on the MH17 website ofHector Reban. The story about the way in which evidence concerning the downing of flight MH17 has been gathered and disseminated to the public sphere seems to be part of a new phenomenon. Perception management to gain popular consent for political decision-making in cases of international importance is based more and more on OSINT, collected and explained by non-state actors (bloggers, NGOs).
For the wider public, the Ghouta gas attack in Syria in 2013 was the start of the quest for OSINT, It was spearheaded by British blogger, Eliot Higgins, a.k.a. Brown Moses, who established himself as a reliable collector of freely available information. On the basis of OSINT it could be established, so the narrative went, that the Syrian government was responsible for chemical warfare against the rebels, a way of waging war not seen since World War I, or the Holocaust, for that matter. In this way Higgins, who would found Bellingcat a few days before MH17 crashed, actually was responsible, in a way, for building up pressure on president Obama, who had drawn a red line against the violence that the Assad government was permitted to use against the jihadi rebels. Hence the approach to exert influence by blogging on the basis of OSINT became a serious matter from that moment on, certainly after it was welcomed across Western media.
In principle, OSINT comprises all information in the public domain, also information disseminated by ordinary people on social media. Keywords in this respect are neutrality, authenticity and spontaneity. It will be clear why this type of information is so attractive: it can be juxtaposed to information coming from official sources, sources that are clearly self-interested and have often been implicated in spin and lies. Messages from ordinary people shared on social media on the other hand are perceived as inherently neutral, bottom-up and pure, free from the manipulation permeating our society on an everyday basis through advertising, public relations (PR), and ‘public diplomacy’ (state propaganda). The same goes for information collected from sources associated with planning and decision-making, something normally associated with intelligence; the contexts of social geography, physical geography, anthropology, all studies of the ‘environment’ used for gathering intelligence…
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The Coming Trial of the MH17 Suspects The Case Against the Prosecution – PART II
PART II. MH17 and Open Source Intelligence: The SBU and Its Volunteer Intelligence Unit
